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USE TAX NEED NOT BE COLLECTED BY OUT-OFSTATE VENDOR LACKING MATERIAL
CONTACT WITH TAXING STATE
Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland'
The Supreme Court of the United States, in this case,
considered the application of the collection provision of
the Maryland Use Tax Statute2 to an out-of-state retailer
neither engaged in a mail order business with Maryland
residents nor employing solicitors in that state.
Miller Brothers, appellant, was a corporation engaged
in the retail furniture trade, chartered and physically
located in Delaware, and not licensed to do business in
Maryland. Newspaper, radio and television advertising
was utilized which, although it reached Maryland residents,
was not directed at them. 3 When Maryland residents purchased items from the corporation's retail store it was
necessary for them to enter the state of Delaware. Some
of the items were carried away by these purchasers and
others were delivered to the purchasers in appellant's truck
or by common carrier. The Maryland use tax levies an
exaction on the "use, storage, or consumption" in Maryland
of tangible personal property "purchased from a vendor
within or without this State".4 The tax is to be collected
from the purchaser by the vendor and remitted to the
State.5 The appellant refused and failed to collect or remit
this tax on goods sold to Maryland residents in its store
in Delaware. Consequently, when appellant's truck was in
Maryland making deliveries it was attached by the State
in a proceeding to collect the tax due; and the Maryland
court held appellant liable for the tax on all merchandise
sold to Maryland residents, regardless of the method of
delivery.' The Maryland Court of Appeals held that this
1347 U. S. 340, reh. den. 964 (1954).
2
Md. Code (1951), Art. 81, Secs. 368-396.
8
Appellant had utilized no radio or television advertising since January
1, 1951, over three years prior to the present decision. The newspaper advertising was limited to Delaware publications and the radio and television
advertising was accomplished by a station in Delaware. Appellant's radio
slogan was "Furniture Fashion Makers for Delaware".
'Md. Code (1951), Art. 81, Sec. 369.
Ibid, Sec. 371. This collection is limited in the statute to those vendors
"engaging in business" in Maryland, but this is defined in Sec. 368(k) as
"selling or delivering in this State, or any activity in this State in connection with the selling or delivering in this State, of tangible personal property
for use, storage or consumption within this State".
6Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 201 Md. 535, 95 A. 2d 268 (1953).
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involved no violation of either the Commerce Clause or the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a 5-4 opinion,
reversed and remanded the decision on the ground that
the collection of the tax through the seizure of appellant's
truck violated the guarantees of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.7 Mr. Justice Jackson, in the
majority opinion, reasons that: "The practical and legal
effect of the Maryland statute as it has been applied to this
Delaware vendor is to make the vendor liable for a use tax
due from the purchaser. In economic consequence, it is
identical with making him pay a sales tax."' He states the
question to be "whether this vendor, by its acts or course
of dealing has subjected itself to the taxing power of Maryland or whether it has afforded that State a jurisdiction or
power to create this collector's liability". Recognizing that
it is not constitutionally necessary for a taxpayer to be physically located in the taxing state in order to be subject to a
state imposed exaction, the opinion points out that "due
process requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax",' and concludes that the necessary
link was absent here. The opinion reasoned that more substantial contacts existed with the collecting state in the
earlier cases which had sustained compulsory collection of
use taxes by out-of-state vendors.
The case owes much of its significance to the fact that
it was the first time a litigant questioning the collection of
a general use tax10 had prevailed in the United States
Supra, n. 1, 342.
Ibid, 344. The Opinion falls to make it clear whether there could be a
difference In result according to whether appellant is to be considered as
paying a sales tax or a use tax, and also whether there is any difference
between the contacts necessary to support a power to tax and those necessary to support a collector's liability. It cites McCleod v. J. E. Dilworth
Co., 322 U. S. 327 (1944), a sales tax case, to demonstrate the inapplicability of a sales tax to the appellant in the present case, and concludes
(p. 346) that "it would be a strange law that would make appellant more
liable for another's tax than to a tax on itself". But there is no conclusion
that can fairly be drawn from the McCleod case that a use tax would not
have withstood assault in that case. See note 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1086 (1944),
and infra, circa, n. 12.
Ilbid, 344-5. The paucity of "constructive discussion" in "responsible
commentary" concerning a state's power to reach extraterritorial transactions and non-residents with tax liabilities is noted. Consider ivfra, circa,
ns. 39, 46.
" General use taxes are those use taxes which are not limited in their
application to a specific commodity or class of commodities. General use
taxes were preceded by use taxes on gasoline and railway equipment. See
Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86 (1934); Southern Pac. Co. v.
8
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Supreme Court over the taxing state. The general use tax
came into the Court in 1937, in Henneford v. Silas Mason
Co.," which established its constitutionality against Commerce Clause objection. Both Commerce Clause and Due
Process objections were met and answered in Southern
Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, the Court emphasizing that it was
a reasonable exercise of the State's taxing power over a
taxable event within the state, namely, the use of the property, which was not to be made invalid by the argument
that as to property purchased outside the State it was in
effect the same as a sales tax on an out-of-state sale. These
two cases, however, did not deal with the right of the state
to force an out-of-state vendor to collect the tax, which
was first presented in Felt & TarrantCo. v. Gallagher.3 In
a brief opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds for a unanimous
court, a foreign corporation selling comptometers through
local solicitors was held validly forced to collect the California Use Tax, the court relying on the Henneford case,
supra, Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 4 and Monamotor
Oil Co. v. Johnson.5 The latter two decisions had sustained
respectively the right of a State to require: (a) local distributor to report amounts of all gasoline received, sold, or
used, whether in interstate commerce or not, for information purposes in collection of excise taxes; and (b) local
distributor of motor oil received from another state to collect tax on motor vehicle fuel used or otherwise disposed of
in the state.
The problem next came before the Court in Nelson v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.'6 The Sears corporation both maintained retail stores and conducted mail-order business in
Iowa, the taxing state, and was licensed to do business
there. The Iowa general use tax statute was essentially
the same as the present Maryland Act, and though the
Sears corporation collected a sales tax from the vendees
and remitted it to the state in the course of the business
of its retail stores, it neither collected nor remitted a use
tax from its mail-order business. The Court concluded
that, although payment of the tax possibly involved conGallagher, 306 U. S. 167 (1939), cases decided on Commerce Clause grounds.
See also CRIz, THE USE TAX; ITS HisTORy, ADMINISTRATION, AND ECONOMIC
EFFECTS, (Public Administration Service, #78, 1941).
n 300 U. S. 577 (1937).
'2Supra, n. 10, discussed in 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 712 (1939).
U306 U. S. 62, 66-68 (1939).
- 256 U. S. 642, 650 (1921).
15Supra, n. 10, 93, 95; of. the text thereof.
16312 U. S. 359 (1941), noted in 41 Col. L. Rev. 915 (1941). See WooD,
DuE PRocEss OF LAW (1951), 376.
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siderable expense to the out-of-state vendor,"7 the exaction
did not contravene the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion couched its reasoning in
rather well established due process language, that benefits
accruing to the corporation by nature of its maintenance of
retail stores in the taxing state rendered it subject to the
taxing power of the state. The Court reasoned that Iowa
having extended to the corporation the privilege of qualifying to do business there:
"... Iowa can exact this burden (collecting its use
tax on the corporation's mail-order business) as a price
of enjoying the full benefits flowing from its Iowa business ... these mail orders ... are not unrelated to respondent's course of business in Iowa .... Hence to
include them in the global amount of benefits which
respondent is receiving from Iowa business is to conform to business facts."'
In declaring that no unjust situation was created by the
fact that Sears was forced, by the decision, to compete
with mail-order organizations without retail stores, and
therefore free of the use tax burden, the Court pointed out
that these corporations solely of a mail-order nature enjoyed not the benefits of the taxing state as did Sears.9
The Sears case was closely followed by Nelson v. Montgomery Ward," in which the fact situation was practically
identical with that of the Sears case. The Court rested its
entire opinion on that earlier case; therefore, the Montgomery Ward case offered no new considerations.
The strong, and rather clear, dicta in the Sears case
might have led the hasty to conclude that retail stores, or
a license to do business, in the taxing state were a sine quo
non of use tax liability of out-of-state vendors." Such a
supposition would have been proven erroneous by General
Trading Co. v. Tax Commission.2 In this case the corporation was not licensed to do business in the taxing state
and its activity there was confined to the presence of salesmen who solicited orders to be mailed out of the taxing
17 The Sears Corporation, basing its judgment on Illinois experience, estimated that, assuming an Iowa business on which the tax amounted to
$100,000, it would be able to collect only $68,000, and that this would cost
approximately $13,000 a year. Ibid, 865.
Ibid, 364.
Ibid, 365.
"312 U. S.373 (1941).
'Not so hasty was the author of a note in 41 Col. L. Rev. 915 (1941).

2322 U. S. 335 (1944), noted in 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1086 (1944) ; See also
WooD, op. cit., 8upra, n. 16, 378.
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state to the corporation's headquarters. The goods ordered
were then sent by mail to the vendee in the taxing state.
To establish the propriety of compelling the vendor to collect and remit a use tax in the light of the Due Process
Clause, Mr. Justice Frankfurter termed the tax an "exaction.., made against the ultimate consumer"," and briefly
dismissed the attack on the means of collecting the tax by
stating that it was a "familiar and sanctioned device", 2
citing the Monamotor25 and Felt & Tarrant cases.2 6 He
justified the tax burden by noting the obvious benefits enjoyed by the residents of the taxing state, the "ultimate
consumers". Mr. Justice Jackson, in his dissent, pointed
out what he considered an anomalous situation." He noted
that the majority would allow the state to make a person
a tax collector for the state when the state lacks the power
to tax that person.
Thus, the cases which offered guiding ratio decidendi
upon which the question in the Miller case turns are the
0
Felt & Tarrant,1 Sears, Roebuck, 9 Montgomery Ward,"
8
and General Trading Company ' cases. In each of these, as
in the Miller case, the propriety of making an out-of-state
vendor a mandatory tax collector was considered. Each
discussed the right of the state to tax in the light of wellfounded precedent; namely, that the state derives its power
to tax by reason of benefits which the state has conferred
upon the persons who furnish the exaction. This benefits
theory, though dating back many years,"2 was pronounced
Ibtd, 338.

MIbid.

"292 U. S. 86 (1933), supra, circa, n. 10.
"306 U. S. 62 (1939), supra, circa,n. 13.
'"Supra,n. 22, dis. op. 339, 340. He said:
"I can imagine no principle of states' rights or state comity which
can justify what is done here. Nor does the practice seem conducive
to good order in the federal system."
"306 U. S. 62, 66-68 (1939), supra,circa, n. 13.
812 U. S. 359 (1941), supra, circa,n. 16.
"312 U. S. 373 (191), supra, circa, n. 20.
1322 U. S. 335 (1944), supra, circa,n. 22.
2For applications of the benefits theory in various factual contexts, see
Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905) ; Baldwin v. Missouri,
281 U. S. 586 (1930); Connecticut General Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77
(1938) ; Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357 (1939) ; Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney
Co., 311 U. S. 435 (1940). It might be observed that the limitations of
state taxation were based upon concepts of sovereignty and elemental law
rather than due process until Louisville &c. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S.
385 (1903) ; see McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (U. S. 1819), and
Hays v. The Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 Howard 596 (U. S. 1854),
decided prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and also
Raliroad Company v. Jackson, 7 Wallace 262 (U. S. 1868) ; St. Louis v.
The Ferry Co., 11 Wallace 423 (U. S. 1870) ; State Tax on Foreign Held
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with clarity by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Wisconsin v.
J. C. Penney Co. as being,
"6... whether property was taken without due process
of law, or, if paraphrase we must, whether the taxing
power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state.
The simple but controlling question is whether the
state has given anything for which it can ask return."3
Though this particular concept of due process and state
taxation was applied in the three earlier cases involving
collection of use taxes from out-of-state vendors, there
was no clear cut indication of its separate relation to:
(a) the imposition of the use tax on the intra-state user,
and (b) the imposition of the collector's liability on the
out-of-state vendor. In the Sears34 and Montgomery Ward"5
cases the benefits conferred upon the vendor were considered, thereby suggesting the same basic criteria in determining the constitutionality of compelling a person to
collect a tax for the state and in causing a person to become
a taxpayer. However, the majority in the General Trading
Company case" referred to the "ultimate consumer 3 7 as
the sole person for whom an accrual of benefits must be
demonstrated in order to support constitutionality of imposing a use tax, but offered no analysis of the facts of
benefit to the seller so as to support the state's authority to
make him the tax collector. It was this absence of sufficient
due process basis for reaching the seller to which Mr.
Justice Jackson objected in his dissent.3 It is possible, however, that the majority, although not explicit on this subject, felt that the solicitation of the mail orders in Iowa
Bonds, 15 Wallace 300 (U. S. 1872). In Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky,
199 U. S. 194, cone. op. 211 (1905), Mr. Justice Holmes, concurring with
the invalidation of a state tax because of a paucity of state conferred
benefits, is grieved and somewhat bewildered by the majority's invocation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also CooLEY, TAXATION (4th Ed., 1924),
Sec. 89. For more exhaustive treatment of the evolution of the concept of
due process limitations on state tax power see Hellerstein and Hennefeld,
State Tacation in a National Economy, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 949 (1941);
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HisTony OF THE UNITED

STATES (1953), Ch. XXXII; Comment, Withdrawal of Due Process Limitations on State Tax Jurisdiction,50 Yale L. J. 900 (1941).
311 U. S. 435, 444 (1940).
8
Supra, n. 29.
SSupra, n. 30.
0 Supra, n. 31.
88IbTd, 388.
Ibid, dis. op. 339, 340.
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was sufficient contact by the seller with Iowa to supply the
necessary support for the majority's conclusion."
Referring to these earlier related decisions, as well as
earlier more general cases relating to jurisdiction to tax,
the majority opinion in the Miller case said "we are unable
to find in any of our cases a precedent for sustaining the
liability asserted by Maryland here".4" Finding the General
Trading Co. case, supra, to be "the nearest support for
Maryland's position" (and noting his dissent even under
the facts of that case), Mr. Justice Jackson reasoned in
distinguishing it:
"That was the case of an out-of-state merchant entering the taxing state through traveling sales agents to
conduct continuous local solicitation followed by delivery of ordered goods to the customers ... there is a
wide gulf between this type of active and aggressive
operation within a taxing state and the occasional delivery of goods sold at an out-of-state store with no
solicitation other than the incidental effects of general
advertising."41
The brief dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas,4 2
concurred in by Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Clark and
The Chief Justice, reasons: (a) that use taxes increasingly
play important roles in the tax programs of States and may
be easily avoided if out-of-state vendors cannot be called on
to be collectors; (b) the principles of the General Trading
Co. case support Maryland's position herein; (c) the Maryland law imposed only a "minimal burden" on the vendor,
who "will be paid for its trouble" in collecting the tax;43
(d) the case was not one of "minimal contact" since the
appellant knew where the goods were to be consumed, that
its advertising reached Maryland consumers, and that it
regularly made deliveries in Maryland with its own delivery trucks and common carriers. The dissent, after noting that jurisdiction was obtained by attaching appellant's
truck while it was in Maryland, further observes that if
a Compare to the doing of a single act as basis for the jurisdiction of
courts over non-resident individuals or corporations: Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U. S. 352 (1927) ; Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 627 (1935) ;
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 318 (1945) ; Compania
de Astral S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 107 A. 2d 357 (Md. 1954) ; and see,
Reiblich, Jurisdictionof Maryland Courts over Foreign Corporations, 3 Md.

L. 0Rev. 35, 67-72 (1938).
' 347 U. S. 340, 345 (1954).
Ibid, 346-347.
"Ibid, dis. op. 357-358.

8The Maryland Statute allows the vendor-collector 3% of the gross tax
as compensation, Md. Code (1951), Art. 81, Sec. 384.
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appellant should choose to stay out of Maryland "the Maryland courts will of course have no jurisdiction over it".
It is a matter of some probability, because of numerous
use tax statutes4" and divers tax situations created by
nuances of business practice, that Miller Brothers v. Maryland will not be the last case of its type to come under the
deliberation of the Court."' Also, with the sudden and
lamented death of Justice Jackson, his successor will swing
the balance of power as to whether the Miller case continues long to be the law as to its very facts or others
closely analogous to them. However, that may be resolved,
the question in each future case would seem to be one of
how much contact with the state by an out-of-state vendor
is sufficient to support the State's making him its tax collector. Realistically considered, if a State may subject a
non-resident individual or corporation to suit in the courts
of that State on causes of action arising out of single acts
done within the State, or contracts made within the State,"
it might be considered just as reasonable to require a nonresident individual or corporation to collect a use tax related to any use that grew out of any activity done in the
State by the non-resident individual or corporation. Lacking any such contact with the State as to the use which is
taxed, the foreign corporation, or non-resident individual
might validly expect constitutional exemption from the
taxing State's jurisdiction.
AMUSEMENT PARKS

-

LIABILITY OF OWNER FOR

INJURY ON CONCESSIONAIRE'S DEVICE
Kuhn v. Carlin'
Suit was entered in the Court of Common Pleas by the
Plaintiff, Kuhn, to recover from the Defendant, Carlin,
owner and operator of an amusement park, for personal injuries when a fitting on an amusement device broke. The
"There were thirty states with use tax statutes on October 5, 1953.
CCH ALL STATES SALEs TAX REPORTER (1953), 601, et seq.

" The Arkansas Supreme Court on May 24, 1954, gave prompt but restricted application to the Miller case in deciding five cases by one opinion
finding the Supreme Court rule applicable to two situations but inapplicable
to the other three, where solicitation in the State by a salesman or maintenance of a salesroom there were held sufficient to support the collector's
liability; Thompson v. Rhodes-Jennings Furn. Co., 268 S. W. 2d 376 (Mo.,
1954).
"See n. 39, supra.
1196 Md. 318, 76 A. 2d 345 (1950).

